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ESTATE OF BROAD

cial elections held to fill vacancies arising in terms occupied at
the time of its passage would lead to arbitrary and capricious
results. To cite one: If the special election here involved were
to be held in the new enlarged district, the voters of the 46th
Assembly District, which district has been added to the old
17th Congressional District, would be accorded double representation in the present Congress for they are already represented by the congressman from their old district in whose
selection they had a voice. As already shown, such double representation is improper. By the same token the voters of the
46th Assembly District are not disenfranchised by restricting
the special election to fill the vacancy to the old district for, as
stated, they are already represented in this Congress.
Weare satisfied, therefore, that the only practical and sound
conclusion is that regardless of the repeal of the act (§ '117,
Pol. Code) creating and delineating the old district, the special election to fill the vacancy now existing should be held in
the old district, thus retaining the same proportionate Congressional representation under the old app'ortionment act
and giving to the new apportionment act application to the
selection of representatives for the Reventy-eighth and succeeding Congresses, as intended.
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was entitled to receive only the portion of eash on band at the
date of the death of the testator which remainedaftcT the
payment of indebtedness and the cost of administering the
estate, exclusive of the expenses of maintaining the cstate
during the period of administration.
[2] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Appeal-Judgments Appealable.-A judgment on a petition for partial distribution
and for interpretation of a will containing bequests to charities, which judgment determines to whom property is distrib~
utable, is appealable under Prob. Code, § 1240.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue forthwith upon the
filing of this decision.

[3a, 3b]Charities-Restrictions on Bequests-Excessive Bequeots.
-Prob. Code, § 41, as amended in 1937, does not invalidate a bequest or devise to charitable uses contrary to its provisions.
the
Where the· testator dying within 30 days after execution
will does not leave any of the designated heirs, the testamentary disposition remains unaffected. Where he leaves· any
of such heirs, they take "if and to the extent that they would
have taken said property as aforesaid," that is,if they would'
otherwise have taken the property under the will or the lawlI
of succession, and to the extent that they would otherwise
have taken the property under the will or such laws. Hence,
where a testator died within 30 days after executing a will
containing specific and residuary bequests contrary to Prob.
Code, § 41, and he was survived by nephews and nieces, the
property bequeathed to charitable uses· should be distributed
to them in accord with the laws of succession.

[L. A. No. 17945. In Bank. July 29, 1942.]

[4] Statutes-Interpretation-Presumptions-Intent to Chango
Law.-A material change in the wording of a code section indicates that the Legislature intended a change in the respects
in which the previous language was amended.

Estate of WILLIAM J. BROAD, Deceased. SECURITY.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LOS ANGELES (a Na.
tional Banking Corporation), as Executor, etc., Peti.
tioner and Respondent, v. WILLIA~ BROAD, Con.
testant and Respondent; R. F. PIERCE et aI.,
Appellants.
[la,lb] Wills-Estate or Amount Passing.-Undera bequest of
"all money remaining in my estate after payment of my in.
debtedness and the cost and expenses of administering my
estate," construed with the remainder of the will, the legatee
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 361(1) j [2] Decedents' Es.
tates, § 1067 j [3] Charities, § 16 j [4] Statutes., § 184.

of

~~

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County interpreting a will and determining distributees of an estate. Frank A. Leonard, Judge. Affirmed.
Duckworth, Mussell & King for Appellants.
Fred A. Wilson and Walter J. Hartzell for Respondents.
Garret W. McEnerney, as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of
Respondents.
[3] See 5 Cal. Jnr. 8.
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SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment on a petition of the executor for the interpretation of the will of the
decedent.
The controversy involves the construction and application
of section 41 of the Probate Code as amended in 1937 (Stats.
1937, p. 1435). That section provides: "No estate, real or permllal, may be hequeathed or devised to any charitable or benevolent society or corporation, or to any person or persons in
trust for charitable uses, by a testator who leaves a spouse,
brother, sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor surviving him, who, under the will, or the laws of succession, would
otherwise have taken the property so bequeathed or devised,
unless the will was duly executed at least thirty days before
the death of the testator. If so exeeuted at least thirty days
before the death, such devices [sic] and legacies shall be valid,
but they may not collectively exceed one-third of the testator's
estate as against his spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece, deRcendant or ancestor, who would otherwise, as aforesaid, have
taken the excess over one-third, and if they do, a pro rata
deduction from such devises and legacies shall be made so as
to reduce the aggregate thereof to one-third of the estate. All
property bequeathed or devised contrary to the provisions of
this section shall go to the spouse, brother, sister, nephew,
niece, descendant or ancestor of the testator, if and to the
extent that they would have taken said property as aforesaid
but for such devises or legacies; otherwise the testator's estate
shall go in accordance with his will and such devises and
legacies shall be unaffected. ' ,
William J. Broad executed his last will and testament on
April 8, 1939. He died three days later. By his will he forgave
to his friends, Arthur and Florence Brock, their indebtedness
to him, with the exception of the sum of $6,000. The ~6,000
owed by the Broeks he bequeathed in equal shares to Grace
Methodist Church, Redlands, California, and David and Margaret's Home, La Verne, California. He forgave his friends,
R. F. and Alberta Pierce, the indebtedness owed by them and
in addition bequeathed to them" all money remaining in my
estate after payment of my indebtedness and the cost and
expenses of administering my estate."
The only other provision of the will which requires mention
is the hClluest of "all of the rest, residue and remainder" of
the estate in equal shares to twelve named legatees, including
the Pierces, Grace Methodist Church of Redlands, David and
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Margaret's Home of LaVerne, and Volunteer~ of America.
The dec0dent left no spouse, brother, sister, descendant or
ancestor surviving him but didleave several nieces and riephews, none of whom was named in the will with the possible
exception of Martha Broad Berry who was designated therein
asa cousin: The appraised value of the estate was $28,331.49.
After the expiration of six months from 'the first publication
of notice to creditors the Security-First National Bank of Los
Angeles, named in the will as executoi, filed a firstaccol.fnt
current, together with a petition for partial distrib,ution and
petition lor interpretation of the will. R. F. and Alberta
Pierce filed an answer to the petition for interpretation,and
objections to the account and petition for distribution.
William Broad, a nephew of the decedent, also filed an
answer.
By their answer the Pierces sought to have the court interpret the will so as to authorize distribution to them of all
moneys remaining at the time of final distribution, including
all assets which could be converted into cash, after payment
of specific bequests and costs of administration.
The answer of William Broad set forth a claim of sole heirship as a nephew of the testator; that .as sole heir he would be
entitled to have distributed to him the bequests and devises to
the thrce charitable institutions, and that the Pierces would be
entitled only to the portion of the money on hand at the date
of death which remained after payment of indebtedness and
the cost of administering the estate. After a hearing on the
petition and answers the court found that the decedent leftas
his heirs at hw three nephews and five nieces, descendants of
a deceased brother and a deceased sister; that Grace Meth.
-odist Church of Redlands, David and Margaret's Home of La
Verne, and Volunteers of America were charitable institu~
tions within the meaning of section 41 of. the Probate Code
and were not exempt from its provisions ( §42 Prob. Oode).
The court. determined that by reason of the death of·· the
decedent within thirty days after executing his will and the
survival of . the nieces and nephews,. the specific and. residuary
bequests to the three named charitable institutions were invalid, and that the property thereby bequeathed should be
distributed to the nicces and nephews in aecordance withthe
laws of sp.ccession. [Ia] The court further concluded that the
Pierces . were .entitled under. the. specific bequest· to receive
onty the portion of cash on hand at the date of the death df
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the testator which remained after the payment of indebtedness and the cost of administering the estate, exclusive of the
expenses of maintaining the estate during the period of administration. Judgnwnt was entered that the named nieces
and nephews would be entitled to take in designated proportions the property bequeathed to the charitable institutions,
namely, the $6,000 owed by the Broeks and three-twelfths of
the residue.
The Pierces have appealed from the judgment. It is their
contention that the charitable bequests should devolve to them
under the specific bequest of moneys on hand; or that the
$6,000 bequest should fall into the residue and become distributable to all the residuary legatees including themselves,
with the exception of the charitable legatees, and that the
portion of the residue otherwise distributable to the, charitable
institutions should be distributed to the surviving heirs at
law.
[2] Preliminary toa discussion of the merits we note that
the judgment was properly appealable as one determining the
persons to whom distribution should be made (§ 1240, Prob.
Code). The court and the parties treated the proceeding as
one for that purpose. The qucstion raised by amicus curiae
whether the judgment appealed from would be conclusive on
persons not appearing or not represented in the proceedings,
or whether such persons would be precluded on final distribution from asserting rights to a distributive share not in accordance with the court's adjudication, is not a question
which need be determined on this appeal, especially in the absence of an objection by the appellants, and no such objection
was made by them. [lb] There is no merit in the appellants'
contention that the court erred in its conclusion that the legacy of money was limited as ordered in the judgment. The
language of the legacy provision, read and considered with
the other provisions for specific and residuary bequests, fully
supports the court's construction of the specific legacy.
[3ll] The principal question for determination is the correctness of the court's interpretation and application of section 41 of the Probate Code. That section was founded on
former section 1313 of the Civil Code. As originally enacted
section 1313 declared void any bequest or devise for charity
contained in a will executed within thirty days of the testator's death, or any disposition to charity of more than onethird of the estate by a testator leaving heirs at law. By ex-
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press provic;ion the property involved in any such void bequest
went "to the residuary legatee, or devisee, next of kin or
heirs according to law." In Estate of RusseZZ, 150 Cal. 604
[89 Pac. 345], it was held that under that section and section
1332 of the Civil Code (now § 126, Prob. Code), the property
mentioned in such a void legacy passed to the residuary devisee ~d not to the heirs unless a contrary intention appeared
in the will.
In Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 689 [115 Pac. 242], it was
stated that the legislative restriction' on bequests to charity
was not intended as a mortmain statute or as declaratory of
any public policy relative to charitable dispositions by will,
but that its purpose was to protect the heirs at law against
'hasty and improvident gifts by the testator of his entire estate:
to charity' and to the exclusion of those who in the judgment
of the Legislature had a better claim to his bounty.
In 1933 the matter of the Estate of Garthwaite, 131 Cal.
App. 321 [21 P. '(2d) 465], was decided. There the testatrix
left no heirs. She executed a will within thirty days preceeding her death whereby she left her entire estate in trust for
charitable uses. The sole queStion was whether that disposition was void under section 1313 of the Civil Code (reenacted
in 1931 as section 41 of the Probate Code). It was contended
that since the testatrix left no heirs the bequests should be
deemed valid. It was held, however, that the testamentary disposition was void under the plain language of the statute. In
1937 the Legislature amended section 41 to read as first above
quoted. Subsequently the matter of the Estate of Mautner,
38 Cal. App. (2d) 521 [101 P. (2d) 520], was decided. The
facts were similar to those involved in the Garthwaite case. In
accordance with the amended statute an order distributing
property to a charitable organization was affirmed.
It is the contention of the appellants and of amicus curiae
that the purpose of the 1937 amendment was only to obviate
the result declared in the Garthwaite estate and to produce
the result declared in the Mautner estate, namely, that when
there is surviving no spouse, brother, sister, nephew, niece,
descendant, or ancestor, the restrictions of section 41 do not
apply and the property should go in accordance with the will,
but that when such heirs do survive, property bequeathed in
excess of the restrictions passes into the residue by virtue of
section 126 of the Probate Code and the decision in Estate of
Russell, supra. In other words a construction is urged which
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'Y:Puld;,bc:>i-qaecordanee with the language as it read prior to
t4e 'anlen'dlucnt of 1937, that 1111 dispositions contrary to the
rpst;riciions \' shall be ,void and· go to the residuary legatees or ."
devisees, or. heirs, according to law." ,The amended section
do'es not invalidate the bequest or devise to charitable uses. It
provides that. "all property bequeathed or devised '. contrary .
to,the pro~islons oUhiS section shall go to the spouse,brother,
siste~, ncphel\", niece, descendant or ancestor of the testator i~:
and, to, the extent that they would have ta,ken .said property as
a~9r,esaid'Jblli for I'luch devises. or legacit's; otherwL<:E) the tes~,
tutor's' estate shall go in aecord:mce with his willimd such'
4~;vise~ and,: legacies shall be unafi,ected. ~,'.
.
; [4] Suchn ID.'tterial ehange in the wording of thescction
plainly in(~icates that the Legislature intended a change
th<; ,r,espt"ctsin which the previous l:mr.-nage ,,-as amended.',
(People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116, 118 [255 Pac. 792, 52 A.L.
~,811]i ~oew's Inc. v. IlyrcLm, 11 Cal. (2d) 746, 750 [82 P.
(2d) 1].)' 13b] UndouuteJly the Legislature inte'ndedthe
change to accord with thc result in the Mautner case, to the
\}ffec~ that ,the teststmentary disposition should be unaffec~ed
where",the testator did not leave any of the d'$ignated heirs.
Also,in accord, with the obvious design to protect those heirs
against "hasty and improvident gifts to charity" (Estate, or
Dwyer, supra), t}{e Ledslature provided that property' bequeathed or dcvisetl contrary to the restrictions "shall go to
the !!lpou~e,", etc. ~'teaJling must be given to thf) lanb'1lal7e thus
employed. It was plainly intended that in that event such
heirs should take. How they should take is then stated: "if
and to the e:-;:tent that they would have taken said property
as aforesa~:d", that ~s: "if" they "would otherwise have
taken' 'said. property" under the will or the laws of succession;" and ·"to the extent." that they "would otherwise have
taken" said property "under the will or the laws of succession." With this inteIltion ,and purpose in mind we find no
difficulty ill con~luding that the court was correct in determin-,
ing that the' surviving heirs should take under the laws of
s;qcee~s~Qn.,
.
:':I'he,:judgment isaffirmcd.
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Gibs,on,'
C. J., Curtis,
J."and
Carter, J., concurred.
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, TRAYNOR; J;-I dissent. The mnjority opinion assumes
that the bequests' to the charitable institutions were .invalid

o.

(2d) 8121.

'and that the problem resolves itselfifito dete~·m.IHit1giwhetiiei
the heirs or thc residuary legatees shouldreceive',th~i propetty.
There canbc no question, however, as towhbminicb:l)roperlt
shall go until it is first d()termined~hethbr
gift to . the
charities is invalid. Section 41 of theProb~t6 Cod~ 'as
'amended iIi i937 provides as' follows: ":N6 .~$tate; real'o1personal, may be bequeathed or' devised to ~ny' cl).814tabh;' br
benevolent society or corporation, or to any per'soliot pcrso11S
in trust for charitable uses, by a testator who leaves It spou.~c,
brother, sister, nephew, niece, descendant 01' 'tn~~stor flUrriving him, who, under the will, or tlie laws of BuccessidIl',
would otherwise have taken the properly so" beqtiea:thcd' or
devised, unless the will was duly executeda.t leas(thirty day~
before the death of the testator. If so executed at least thirty
days before death, such devices [si-cland legacies' shaU be
valid, but they may not collectively exceed one-thitd.o£ the
testator's estate as against his spouse, brother, sister;nephew,
niece, descend.ant or ancestor, who would otherWise, ;A.S aforesaid, have taken the excess over one-third, and if they do;
pro rata deduction from such devises and legacies shnll' be
made so as to reduce the aggregate thereof to o:he-thh~d 'of
the estate. All property bequeathtld
d,evis~d contrarY to
the provisions of this sectioll shall go to the spouse, brother,
sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor of the teStator,
if and to the extent that they would have taken said property
as aforesaid but for such devises or legacies;. otherwise the
testator's estate shall/!o ill accordance with'his will aild such
devises and legacies shall be unaffected:"
A bequest to chll.rity is invalid under thissectibn only i(in
addition to the death of the testator within. thirty days' after
the execution of the will, the testator leaves surviving him
designated heirs, "who under the u-ill, or the laws of succession, would otherwise have taken the property so bequedhed/'
The death of the testator within the thirty-day period 3lld
the survival uf the designated heirs are not alune sufficirnt to
invalidate the bl1quest. 'fhere remains the question uhether
the naml'd heirs would "otherwise" have taken the propert7
under the will, or the ]a,vs of succession "but ,for such devises
or legacies." In other words, if the charitable bequests had
not been madr, to whom would the property go under the
will, or, if the will does not cover this contingency, to whom
would the property go under the laws of succession? If ihe
property
.sister,
nephew, niece,
. . would go to spouse, brother,
..
."
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descendant or ancestor the bequest to charity is invalid. If it
would not go to any of these but to more remote kin or
strangers to the blood it is valid. The property cannot go to
the d('.signated heirs, and the charitable bequest is therefore
valid if (a) the testator does not leave surviving him a
nephcw, niece or nearer heir (Estate of Mautner, 38 Cal.
App. (2d) 521 [101 P. (2d) 520]; see Estate of Garthwaite,
131 Cal. App. 321 [21 P. (2d) 465] for the opposite rule
before the 1937 amendment to section 41), or (b) if he has so
framed his will that his nephews, nieces, or nearer heirs would
not take what would otherwise be a defeat~d gift to charity.
Under section 41 as it read before the 1937 amendment, a
void charitable devise passed to the residuary devisee and
not to the heirs, in the absence of a contrary provision in the
will. (Estate of Russell, 150 CaL 604 [89 Pac. 345].) The
1937 amendment to section 41 makes it plain that charitable
bequests and devises are no longer to be sacrificed to the enrichment of rcsiduary bequests or devises given to strangers
to the blood or to heirs more remote than nephew and niece.
That pnrpose is clearly set forth in section 41 as follows: "All
property beqneathed or devised contrary to the provisions
of this section shall go to the spouse, brother, sister, nephew,
niece, descendant or ancestor of the testator, if and to the
extent that thcy would have taken said property as aforesaid
but for such devises or legacies; otherwise the testator's estate shall go in accordance with his will and such devises and
legacies shall be unaffected." The same result is accomplished
by that portion of section 42 reading as follows: "Bequests
and devises ... made by a testator leaving no spouse, brother,
sister, nephew, niece, descendant or ancestor surviving by
whom the property so bequeathed or devised would have been
taken if said property had not been so bequeathed or devised,
are excepted from the restrictions of this article." If none of
the dcsignated heirs can take the property, the restrictions on
charitable bequests do not apply and the property goes in
accordance with the testator's will. The very reasons therefore that exclude the heirs make a charitable bequest valid as
against residuary legatees.
In the present case the decedent left nieces and nephews
surviving him. The validity of the charitable bequests thereforc depends upon whether the property would go to such
heirs but for those bequests. If the residuary bequest to the
charities had not been made there would be an intestacy as
to one-fourth of the residue and the nieces and nephews would
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inherit that property under the laws of succession. That bequest therefore is invalid, and as property bequeathed contrary to the provisions of section 41, it must go to the nieces
and nephcws. If the specific bequest had not been made the
$6,000 would be included in the residue under Probate Code,
section. 126, for it is not otherwise bequeathed by the testator's will. The will contains a residuary clause, which docs
not include the nieces and nephews and they are not otherwise provided for in the will. It is clear therefore that the
nieces and nephews cannot take such property under the
will. Had there been no residuary clause they would have
taken under the laws of succession and the specific bequest
would therefore have been invalid. Sinee there is a residuary
clause, however, they can take under the laws of succession
only to the extent that the residuary' bequests are not effective. The residuary clause left one-fourth of the residue to
three charitable organizations, two of which were legatees
of the $6,000 bequest. The residuary share of the charitable
organization was therefore augmented by one-fourth of the
$6,000 that would have gone to the other residuary legatees
had thc bequcst to such organizations not been made. That
one-fourth cannot go to the other residuary legatees because
it was not bequeathed to them. It cannot go to the charitable
organizations because there are heirs who would have taken
under the laws of succession had it not been bequeathed to
the charity. One-fourth of the $6,000 should therefore go to
the nieces and nephews under the express terms of section
41 that "All property bequeathed or devised contrary to the
provisions of this section shall go to the . . . nephew, niece
... of the testator if and to the extent that they would have
taken said property but for such devises or legacies."
The remaining three-fourths of the $6,000 bequest is a
valid gift to charity by reason of the following express terms
of section 41: " . . . otherwise the testator's estate shall go
in accordance with his will and such . . . legacies shall be
unaffected" and section 42: "Bequests . . . made by a testator leaving no ... nephew, niece . . . surviving by whom
the property so bequeathed . . . would have been taken if
said property had not becn so bequeathed ... are excepted
from the restrictions of this article."
It is immaterial that the charities may benefit by a reversal of the judgment although they are not appellants in

.
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this proceeding. It the part of a judgment appealed .from,

P;6perty from .~. husbnnd to :1 ~·ifo without :con:~idf1r,:iti6n. ;To
nt:lte Ilcausl' of nction attacking II. transfer hy hu~bn:~d to
wife upon the theory of a resulting trust, one'mu~tnilege
c'ithElr that he intended to crcnten trust orthilt' he iritcl1dM
th!tt thE' wife should not h!tvc the beneficial intercst}in the
property.
'., , .
[3]' Id.--Trust&-.Actions-Evidence.-In an action bya' judgment
crl:ditor to rtll'LCh allcged property of the debtor, findings thnt
the debtor husband transferred propcrty to his wife Rlid d!l.1ightcr in trust for his benefit wore not supported where tho evidence did not disclose that he ovrned property which he transfcrrud, but it appeared that she acquired It substantial amount
of sep!tr:ltc property and thnt any deposit of his Harnings in
her bank account or payment thereof on an automobile amounted
at most to a comminglinl; of a small, amount of community property with her separate property.

is 80 dependent upori the remainder .that it affects the whole,
"

'
•'. I', "

',I

"II.:'
"

the appeal is from the entire' judgment, and the appellate
court must do as justicc rel}u1r('.8. (Estate of Murphey, 7 CaL
(2d),' ,712 [62 P. (2d) 374]; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360
[125 Pac. 994, Arin. Cas. 1913E, 1319].) The present appeal
carinotbe limited to the determination in favor of the heirs,
£qr .that a6termination is dependent upon the holding that
~~e gifts to charity nre void. Furthermore, p]'"oceedings to'
determine to whOm distribution shall be made are in rom and
~o jridgm()nt, in perso-nam is give~ in. favor of one party
against another.. (Edlund v. Superior Court, 209 Cal.. 690'
[289 Pac. 841]. Sec, also, 0 'Day v.S1tperior Oourt,18- Cal.
(2d) 540' [116 P.(2d) 621]; Lilienkamp v, Superior Court,
14 Cal. (2d) ~33 [93 P., (2d) 1008].) The objectof the proceedings is ~o ascertain the persons entitled to share in. the
estate, and in the words of the Edlulld case, "It will not be
questioned that justice" and' sound. policy require· that the
estates of decedents be distributed to persons rightfully entitled thereto. . . ."
The judgment ohould be reversed.
Edmonds, J., concurred.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Goodwin J. Knight, Jud~c. Reversed.

4'

Action by judgment creditors to impre.c;s lien of judgment on
certain property as belonging to the judgment debtor. Judgment for plaintiffs revcrsed.
James B. Fredericks for Appellants.
Frederick M. Kraft for Respondents.

[L. A. No. 17819. In Bank. July 30, 1942.]

TONY ALTRAMANO et aI., Respondents, v. W. W. SWAN
et nl., Defendants; LILLIAN J. SWAN, et al., Appellants.
[1] Trusts-Establishmcn~Plcading-Conclusions. -

An nllegation that transfers from one to another were made in trust, that
th" transferee now l.olds the property in trust for tho transferor, an.l that the 9.Ctual, equitl1.ble and beneficial ownership of
the property is in him sufficiently pleads an express trust for
his benefit.

[2]. Husband and Wife-Trusts-Resulting Trusts: Actions-Plead-

ing.-A constructivll trustdOtls not !trise upon the transfElr of
[2] See 25 Cal. Jur. 193, 26 R. C. L. 1230.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 301; [2] Husband and Wife,
§§ 176, 178; [3J Husband and Wife, § 178.

EDMONDS, J.-The appcll:mts, Lillian J .. ' Swan and
Juanita Swan Foreman, her daughter, were sued by t)1e jud?mcnt creditors of W. W .. Swan in an action to Ijlubject nn
Oldsmobile automobile and certnin Postal Certificates to the
payment of thc judgment.
The' compbint contains five counts. In the first three of
them, the respondents assert that W. W, Swan fraudulently
transferred property owned by him to Lillilln J; S'\'ran, his
wife, and Juanita Swan Foreman, his daughter. In thc fourth
.count, the judgment creditors claim thnt W. W. Swan trimsferred the property in controversy to his wife and daughter
in trw;t for hb benefit, and that he is the "actual, equitable
and beneficial" owner of them. The fifth eoimt claims th,e
right to relief upon a different theory; In Inakiiig the b'nrisfers to his wife and daughter, say the rcsp'oudcnis,'Sw:m
received no consideration," and by reaS()n thereof a cOnstrue-

